Rules-Plus-Exception Tasks: A Problem for Exemplar Models?
1 Erickson and Kruschke (2002b) have shown that human subjects generalize category knowledge in a rule-like fashion when exposed to a rule-plus-exception categorization task. This result has remained a challenge to exemplar models of category learning. We show that these models can account for such performance, if augmented with exemplar-specific specificity or exemplar-specific attention. This is, however, only the case if the choice-rule that converts evidence for competing categories into probabilities is sensitive to small differences between evidence values close to 0. Exemplar-specific attention provided the best overall approximation to the data. Exemplar-specific specificity provided a slightly worse approximation but predicted better the rule-like generalization pattern observed.
Perceptual categorization has been, for long, the domain of single-system models that assume the existence of a unique representation upon which categorical decisions are made (Ashby & Gott, 1988; Hintzman, 1986; Nosofsky, 1986; Posner & Keele, 1968; Reed, 1972) . Recently, however, several researchers have identified phenomena that, they argue, can only result from the interaction between two distinct types of category representations: an abstract "explicit" representation, where categories are usually represented by simple rules, and an 'implicit' representation, formed either by exemplars or by complex rules (Ashby, AlfonsoReese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Minda & Smith, 2001) . The debate between single-and multiple-system models is far from resolved as many of the empirical findings previously identified as multiple-system phenomena have received singlesystem explanations (Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000; Nosofsky & Kruschke, 2002; Nosofsky & Zaki, 2002) .
Exemplar models are a very successful class of single-system models (Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky, 1986 Nosofsky, , 1987 Nosofsky, , 1989 . According to these models, subjects store individual category exemplars in memory and classify new stimuli in terms of their relative similarities to the stored exemplars. Exemplar models have been able to account for human performance in many distinct conditions, from ill-defined (McKinley & Nosofsky, 1995) , to rule-like (Nosofsky, 1987 (Nosofsky, , 1989 Nosofsky, Clark, & Shin, 1989) and prototype-like categories (Shin & Nosofsky, 1992) .
Recently, Erickson and Kruschke (2002b) have challenged the generality of exemplar models as models of human category learning. They tested subjects in a rule-plus-exception categorization task. Most of the stimuli could be classified correctly by following a simple rule. However, some of them, the exception stimuli, violated the rule. Subjects who learned to correctly classify all training stimuli tended to classify new stimuli in a rule-like way, even when these were more similar to the exception stimuli than to the remaining training stimuli. With the help of model analyses, Erickson and Kruschke (2002b) concluded that exemplar models could not explain adequately the pattern of generalization evident in learners' performance. In contrast, a multiple-system model could. Here, we re-address the ability of exemplar models to explain human performance in this task.
Previous research has shown that exception stimuli are better recognized than rulefollowing training stimuli after a rule-plus-exception task (Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995; Sakamoto & Love, 2004) . This finding has recently received an exemplar explanation (Sakamoto, Matsuka, & Love, 2004) . Commonly, exemplar models assume similarity to be exemplar independent. Similarity to an exception is judged in the same way as similarity to a rule-following exemplar. Under such an assumption, exemplar models are unable to predict better recognition for exception stimuli. Sakamoto et al. (2004) extended an exemplar model with exemplar-specific attention and showed that this model could predict better recognition for the exception stimuli. Exemplar-specific attention allows some features of the stimuli to be used while judging similarity to a rule-following exemplar and, simultaneously, other features to be used while judging similarity to an exception. This is precisely what they found when simulating human performance using an extended exemplar model. We expect exemplar-specific attention to succeed in replicating the main findings in Erickson and Kruschke (2002b) .
A possible alternative explanation to Erickson and Kruschke's (2002b) findings goes by the name of exemplar-specific "specificity". In contrast with exemplar-specific attention, the same stimulus features are considered while judging the similarity to any of the exemplars. Similarity, however, is exemplar dependent by allowing different exemplars to develop different gradients of similarity. For instance, the parents of identical twins are better able to discriminate between their offspring than between others' identical twins. The similarity to each of their own children has a steeper gradient than the similarity to other identical twins. This difference in gradients may be due to increased experience with some stimuli with respect to other, as suggested by Nosofsky (1987 Nosofsky ( , 1991 . A compelling alternative hypothesis relates exemplar "relevance" to the gradient of similarity: the more relevant an exemplar is, the steeper its gradient of similarity becomes. In a rule-plusexception task, exceptions are more "relevant" than rule-following stimuli and, therefore, might develop steeper gradients of similarity. As a result, stimuli closer to the exceptions do not necessarily need to be classified in the category of the exceptions.
The article is structured as follows. First, we present the exemplar model and its augmented versions. Thereafter, we compare the ability of the augmented versions to explain the data observed in Erickson and Kruschke's (2002b) experiment with that of a traditional exemplar model and a multiple-system model. We conclude with a general discussion.
Overview of exemplar models

ALCOVE
In the analyses presented in this article, we make use of the ALCOVE model, introduced by Kruschke (1992) . ALCOVE is a feed-forward connectionist network whose basic computations closely mimic those of the Generalized Context Model (GCM; Nosofsky, 1986) . The model receives stimuli as input and produces probabilities as output. As in the GCM, the probability of classifying a stimulus into a category depends solely on its similarity to the exemplars stored in the model. In contrast with the GCM, the associations between exemplars and categories are learned and the same holds for the dimensional attention strengths (see below). Here, we present the version of ALCOVE used within ATRIUM (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Erickson & Kruschke, 2002a) , a multi-system model of category learning. This version differs from the original one (Kruschke, 1992) only in the teacher values used in learning: 0 and 1 instead of -1 and 1.
In ALCOVE, stimuli are represented as points in a multidimensional psychological space. Each node in the input layer represents one dimension in the space. Its activity, d i , is the coordinate of the stimulus along the respective dimension.
The nodes in the hidden layer represent the exemplars. Let (e j1 , …, e jn ) be the position of the exemplar associated with node j. The activity of the node is given by
where c is the specificity of the node, Į i is the dimensional attention strength of dimension i, and d i is the coordinate of the stimulus on dimension i. In conceptual terms, the activity of an exemplar node corresponds to the similarity between the exemplar it represents and the stimulus.
In the output layer, each node represents one category. The activity of an output node is given by a weighted sum of the activities of the exemplar nodes,
where w Kj is the weight of the connection between exemplar node j and category node K, and a j is the activity of exemplar node j. The activities of the category nodes are converted into probabilities according to the following equation:
where ĳ is a response scaling factor that represents the degree of response decisiveness. A high ĳ enhances differences in the activations, resulting in more extreme probabilities, whereas a low ĳ as the opposite effect, blurring those differences. As stated above, the weights of the connections between exemplar and category nodes, as well as the dimensional attention strengths, are learned. Learning is achieved by gradient descent on the sum-squared error. During each learning episode, the presentation of a stimulus is followed by feedback, indicating the correct category. Feedback is coded in the network by 'humble teacher values ' (Kruschke, 1992) ,
where a K is the activity of category node K. Gradient descent on error yields the following learning equations:
where the Ȝs (Ȝ>0) are the learning rates. The dimensional attention strengths are constrained to be non-negative, being set to 0 whenever Equation 6 drives them to negative values. ALCOVE has 4 free parameters: the specificity of the exemplar nodes c, the response scaling constant ĳ, the association learning rate Ȝ w , and the attention learning rate Ȝ Į . In all the simulations reported in this article, the weights between exemplar and category nodes are set initially to 0 and the dimensional attention strengths Į i to 1/n, where n is the number of dimensions of the psychological space.
ES-ALCOVE
Sakamoto et al. (2004) have presented a version of ALCOVE with exemplar-specific attention (ES-ALCOVE). This model shares Equations 2 through 5 with ALCOVE. Individual attention weights are incorporated in Equation 1 giving:
where c is the specificity of the node, Į ji is the dimensional attention strength for stimulus j along dimension i, and d i is the coordinate of the stimulus on dimension i. Learning of the dimensional attentional strengths is given by gradient descent on error:
where Ȝ Į (>0) is the attention learning rate. In sum, ES-ALCOVE is defined by equations 2 through 5, and equations 7 and 8. Despite the individual dimensional attention strengths, like ALCOVE, it has 4 free parameters.
ALCOVEc
In ALCOVE, all exemplars share the same specificity value c, i.e. the same similarity gradient. To allow each exemplar to develop its own individual gradient, we extend ALCOVE with exemplar specific specificity values c j , which replace the specificity value c in Equation 1. These values are initially equal to some value c, but they may become distinct as a result of learning. The learning rule for the c j s as given by gradient descent on the sumsquared error is as follows:
where Ȝ c is the specificity learning rate. The specificity values are constrained to be nonnegative, being set to 0 whenever Equation 7 drives them to negative values. Note that the c j values are calculated only on the basis of error values with respect to the correct reproduction of the category measure. They are not parameters that can be freely adjusted to increase the fit to the empirical data (i.e., the subjects' performance). The augmented model, ALCOVEc, has 5 free-parameters in total: the four free-parameters of ALCOVE and the specificity learning rate Ȝ c .
A rule-plus-exception task: Erickson and Kruschke (2002b)
Erickson and Kruschke (2002b) present an experiment where subjects had to classify stimuli into one of six categories. Stimuli were fixed-width rectangles that varied in height and in the horizontal position of an interior vertical line segment. A schematic representation of the stimuli and respective categories is presented in Figure 2 .1. The great majority of the stimuli can be classified in terms of a simple rule: stimuli whose inner vertical line is within the left half of the rectangle belong to category A, whereas the remaining stimuli belong to category B. However, there are four exceptions to this rule, each one belonging to a distinct category. Along with the training stimuli, there are also transfer stimuli to which no correct category was associated. Erickson and Kruschke (2002b) identified T C and T F as the transfer stimuli whose pattern of classification reveals the nature of the representations used in categorization decisions. If subjects are using rules, then stimuli T C and T F , the critical transfer stimuli, should be classified mainly as members of categories A and B, respectively. However, if subjects make use of an exemplar representation, T C and T F should be classified as members of categories C and F, respectively, because of their high similarity to the exception stimuli. The experiment was carried out in three distinct phases. First, only the exception stimuli were presented, thereafter, all training stimuli, and in the final phase, all training and transfer stimuli. Corrective feedback was given after every training stimulus' presentation. Only the data from the last phase, the transfer phase, was considered in the analyses. The results confirmed the rule representation hypothesis. Subjects who learned to classify all training stimuli above chance (learners), classified stimuli T C and T F more often into categories A and B (M = .725) than into categories C and F (M = .194).
Erickson and Kruschke (2002b) fitted ALCOVE and ATRIUM (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998 , 2002a to the performance of the learners. ATRIUM, as presented in Erickson and Kruschke (2002a) , is a feed-forward connectionist network that learns the correct category for a set of stimuli by error-driven learning. It contains an exemplar module that works just like ALCOVE. In addition, it has a number of rule modules, one per stimulus dimension. Each rule module contains rules defined upon the associated dimension that, through learning, are associated differentially with each category. A gating mechanism learns which module better predicts the category for each exemplar. As a result, some exemplars may be classified more in terms of the exemplar module, whereas others are classified more in terms of the rule modules.
ATRIUM is considerably more complex than ALCOVE and this complexity is reflected in the number of free parameters, 11 instead of 4. In addition, ATRIUM contains ALCOVE as a special case and it, therefore, always performs better. To compare models with a different number of parameters, we use the Akaike's information criterion statistic (AIC; Akaike, 1974) . AIC penalizes models for their number of free parameters, allowing those with fewer free parameters to have better (lower) AIC values than those with more free parameters. As auxiliary measures of fit, we also report the root mean-square deviation (RMSD) and the proportion of variance accounted for (R 2 ). Erickson and Kruschke (2002b) found that ALCOVE fitted the data much worse than ATRIUM (see Table 2 .1). Moreover, ALCOVE was not able to correctly predict the pattern of performance observed for the critical stimuli, classifying them mostly in terms of the nearest exception. In contrast, ATRIUM classified these stimuli mostly in terms of a rule. Erickson and Kruschke (2002b) also considered extended versions of ALCOVE, but despite the improvement in fit, none of the fitted models could predict rule-like generalization for the critical transfer stimuli. They concluded that exemplar models were not able to predict adequately human performance in this particular experiment.
Model-based analyses
Erickson and Kruschke (2002b) fitted ALCOVE and ATRIUM exclusively to the performance of the learners for the 31 transfer stimuli during the transfer phase. The remaining data was left unaddressed because it had previously been shown (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998 ) that ALCOVE had trouble in fitting the training and transfer data simultaneously in similar experiments. We fitted ALCOVE, ES-ALCOVE, ALCOVEc, and ATRIUM (Erickson & Kruschke, 2002a) to the data on the transfer stimuli. The best fits were found by minimizing the AIC value using a simulated annealing algorithm (Goffe, Ferrier, & Rogers, 1994) . For all models, we assumed that only the training stimuli were stored as exemplars. In the case of ATRIUM, we further assumed that every possible rule along each of the two stimulus dimensions was present. The best fits reported were obtained by averaging the predicted probabilities over 1000 simulated subjects. Each simulated subject was presented with a different random sequence of stimulus presentation, generated in accordance with the experimental procedure.
The best fits and the patterns of generalization for the critical transfer stimuli are presented in the upper half of Table 2.1. ATRIUM yielded the best fit to the data. Furthermore, it predicted more rule-like generalization for the critical transfer stimuli than exception-like generalization, replicating qualitatively the observed performance. All exemplar models yielded considerable worse fits. Neither of the exemplar models was able to replicate the performance observed for the critical transfer stimuli. They all predicted more exception-like generalization than rule-like generalization. Note. Lower values of AIC reflect a better fit of the model. AIC = Akaike's information criterion statistic; R 2 = proportion of variance accounted for; RMSD = root mean-square deviations; * ALCOVE(EK) and ATRIUM(EK) are the ALCOVE and ATRIUM versions used by Erickson and Kruschke (2002b) .
For the sake of completeness, we fitted all models to human performance for both transfer and training stimuli during the transfer phase. The best fits and patterns of generalization for the critical transfer stimuli are presented in the lower half of Table 2.1. As before, ATRIUM yielded the best fit, followed by ES-ALCOVE, ALCOVEc, and ALCOVE. ATRIUM predicted higher rule-like than exemplar-like generalization for the critical transfer stimuli. None of the exemplar models was able to make this prediction. Despite correctly predicting the pattern of generalization for the critical transfer stimuli, ATRIUM remains far from providing a good quantitative fit. It predicts a difference of .080 between the probability of rule-like generalization and the probability of exemplar-like generalization whereas the empirical difference is .531 (see Table 2 .1).
Model-based analyses using power decisiveness
ALCOVE and the extended versions we consider here use Equation 3 to convert the activity of category nodes into probabilities. In this choice rule, response decisiveness is obtained by applying an exponential function to the activities of the category nodes. An alternative formalization of decisiveness has been used in recent formulations of the GCM model (Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Nosofsky & Zaki, 2002) :
where ĳ is the response scaling parameter. Instead of an exponential function, a power function is used. This change produces, in general, identical results. However, this is not the case when the activity of the category nodes is low. As an example, consider the case of two categories A and B. Let a stimulus produce category node activities .01 and .001 for categories A and B, respectively. Assuming ĳ=1, exponential decisiveness predicts p(A) = .502 and p(B) = .498, whereas power decisiveness predicts p(A) = .909 and p(B) = .091. It is possible to enlarge the difference between p(A) and p(B) under exponential decisiveness by increasing the value of ĳ, but at the cost of losing sensitivity for large differences. To our knowledge, both decisiveness functions have been used without any preference. Here, we consider the effect of switching between them for the task and models we have been considering. Power decisiveness only works for non-negative activation values. However, due to the humble teacher, negative values can occur on any of the models considered. To minimize this problem, we consider a strict teacher instead. In the cases where category nodes show negative activations, we reset these to 0. We incorporated power decisiveness and a strict teacher in all models and fitted them to the data. The best fits and patterns of generalization are presented in Table 2 .2. All exemplar models benefited from the change. In particular, ALCOVEc and ES-ALCOVE benefited the most, now yielding a reasonably good fit to the data (R 2 > .820). Furthermore, both models were able to predict qualitatively the pattern of generalization observed for the critical transfer stimuli. In this respect, ALCOVEc yields a better approximation to the data than ES-ALCOVE. It approximates the observed pattern of generalization when fitted to the partial data set, and still does well when fitted to the complete data set. In both cases, the difference from rule-like to exception-like probability of generalization is greater than .310. ES-ALCOVE predicts a smaller difference: .057 in the case of the full data set. ALCOVE, on the other hand, despite showing a slight improvement in the fits, was still unable to predict the correct pattern of generalization. We conclude that the simple substitution of the decisiveness function is not sufficient to allow exemplar models to predict rule-like generalization for the critical transfer stimuli. Instead, the addition of exemplar-specific specificity or the addition of exemplar-specific attention is necessary.
In contrast with the exemplar models, ATRIUM showed worse fits. Furthermore, it did not predict the pattern of generalization observed when fitted to the transfer stimuli. A comparison between the best version of ATRIUM (i.e. the one using exponential decisiveness) and the best versions of ALCOVEc and ES-ALCOVE (i.e. the one using power decisiveness) shows that all models yield almost identical fits, with ES-ALCOVE yielding slightly better ones. All models are able to replicate qualitatively the pattern of generalization for the critical transfer stimuli. ALCOVEc, however, yields the best approximation. A closer look at ALCOVEc shows that all rule-consistent exemplars develop a lower specificity value than the exception exemplars. As a result, whenever stimulus T C (T F ) is presented, the closest exemplar nodes representing the rule-consistent training stimuli have the highest activation. Because these exemplars are associated mostly with category A (B), the corresponding category node shows the highest activation. The activation values are small though. It is, therefore, essential the use power decisiveness to transform the small differences in activation into larger differences in probabilities. Note. Lower values of AIC reflect a better fit of the model. AIC = Akaike's information criterion statistic; R 2 = proportion of variance accounted for; RMSD = root mean-square deviations.
Discussion
In a previous test, Erickson and Kruschke (2002b) argued that exemplar models could not fit properly human performance in a rule-plus-exception categorization task. In contrast, ATRIUM (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998 , 2002a , a multiple-system model, could. In particular, it could predict rule-like generalization for a set of critical stimuli. Here, we amend this conclusion by showing that certain exemplar models can fit the data as well as ATRIUM and, simultaneously, reproduce rule-like generalization. We considered two distinct extensions to exemplar models: exemplar-specific attention and exemplar-specific specificity. The former has recently been used to explain better recognition of exception stimuli in rule-plus-exception tasks (Sakamoto et al., 2004) . The latter has been suggested in previous research, but not yet used in the rule-plus-exception context. None of them provided improved fits with respect to ATRIUM or replicated rule-like generalization. This was only possible after substituting the exponential decisiveness function in the choice rule by a power function. To our knowledge, previous research has not fully explored the consequences of such a change. Although the exemplar-specific attention extension provided the best explanation to the data, exemplar-specific specificity provided the most accurate replication of rule-like generalization. Furthermore, its fit approximates ATRIUM. The extended exemplar models were able to produce rule-like generalization but maybe at the cost of highly specific parameter values. We explored this by performing a grid search on the parameter values. We found that the specificity learning rate (Ȝ c ) and the initial specificity (c) parameters were the most critical ones in ALCOVEc. In general, rule-like generalization varies proportional to Ȝ c and inversely proportional to c. The model predicts rule-like generalization if Ȝ c is high enough and c is not too high. In ES-ALCOVE, the initial specificity (c) and the attention learning rate (Ȝ Į ) are the critical parameters. Rule-like generalization is obtained when Ȝ Į is large enough and c is not too low or too high. Outside the ranges specified, both models mostly predict exception-like generalization. In sum, both are able to predict robustly rule-like generalization.
Why was ES-ALCOVE unable to replicate the pattern of generalization as well as ALCOVEc? Both models classify the critical transfer stimuli in terms of the closest rule-like exemplars. However, in ES-ALCOVE, some of these exemplars develop a stronger association with the exception category than with the correct category, but are nonetheless categorized correctly because of the contribution of the surrounding exemplars, which share their category and one value among one of the dimensions. Stimulus-specific attention brings the neighboring exemplars together, allowing correct categorization of those exemplars with exception-like associations. The end result is a smaller difference between rule-like and exception-like generalization for the critical transfer stimuli.
Erickson and Kruschke (1998) reported an experiment similar to the one analyzed here. The main result was identical: transfer stimuli closer to the exception than to rulefollowing exemplars were classified mostly according to the rule. They fitted ES-ALCOVE to the data, but it was unable to predict this generalization pattern very well. Our results show, thus, that this may be due to the use of exponential decisiveness in the choice rule and that power decisiveness may provide a better approximation.
We have focused our analysis on exemplar models as a single-system explanation for human performance in a rule-plus-exception task. However, we do not rule out that other single-system models, such as SUSTAIN (Sakamoto & Love, 2004) , may perform as well or even better. Further research is needed to test this. Our results, along with previous ones (Sakamoto et al., 2004) , indicate that exemplar models provide a good approximation to human performance in the ecologically interesting class of rule-plus-exception tasks.
